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Although expanding  scal space for health worker recruitments could reduce workforce shortages in Sub-
Saharan Africa, effective strategies for achieving this are still unclear. We aimed to understand the
process of transitioning health workers (HWs) from PEPFAR to Government of Uganda (GoU) payrolls
and to explore the facilitators and barriers encountered in increasing domestic  nancial responsibility for
absorbing this transitioned workforce. We conducted a multiple case-study of 10 (out of 87) districts in
Uganda which received PEPFAR support between 2013 and 2015 to expand their health workforce. We
purposively selected eight districts with the highest absorption rates (‘High absorbers’) and two with the
lowest absorption rates (‘Low absorbers’). A total of 66 interviews were conducted with high-level o cials
in three Ministries of Finance, Health and Public Service (n = 14), representatives of PEPFAR
implementing organizations (n = 16), District Health Teams (n = 15) and facility managers (n = 22).
Twelve focus groups were conducted with 87 HWs absorbed on GoU payrolls. We utilized the
Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR) to guide thematic analysis.
At sub-national level, facilitators of transition in ‘high absorber’ districts were identi ed as the presence of
transition ‘champions’, prioritizing HWs in district wage bill commitments, host facilities providing ‘bridge
 nancing’ to transition workforce during salary delays and receiving donor technical support in district
wage bill analysis- attributes which were absent in ‘low absorber’ districts. At national-level, multi-sectoral
engagements (incorporating the in uential Ministry of Finance), developing a joint transition road map,
aligning with GoU salary scales and recruitment processes emerged as facilitators of the transition
process.
Overall, PEPFAR support acted as a catalyst for increasing GoU and facility-level budget allocations
towards expanding the health workforce in focus districts in Uganda. Our case-studies offer
implementation research lessons on effective donor transition and insights into pragmatic strategies for
expanding  scal space for health in a low-income setting.
Introduction
Health workforce shortages constitute a fundamental barrier to the attainment of health-related
sustainable development goals (SDGs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Freer 2017; Miseda et al. 2017). It is
estimated that health worker vacancies are as high as 59–70% in several countries in SSA (Zakumumpa
et al. 2016; Jaskiewicz et al. 2016; Vermund et al. 2012).
In countries with decentralized health systems in SSA, health workforce recruitments have been devolved
from the central government to sub-national administrative units commonly referred to as districts in
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda (Abimbola et al. 2019; Sumah et al. 2019; Bossert et al. 2002;
Munga et al. 2009; Sakyi et al. 2011).
Decentralized health worker recruitments in SSA is however beset by a myriad of institutional constraints.
These include; delays in recruitment owing to cumbersome and lengthy administrative procedures, the
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ubiquitous ‘vacancies but no wage bill’ constraint, shortage of pay roll analysis expertise and increasingly
dysfunctional district recruitment committees (Sumah and Baatiema 2019; Munga et al. 2009; Mbemba
et al. 2016 ; Sakyi et al. 2011; Frumence et al. 2013).
In Uganda, decentralization was a part of governance reforms that date as far back as 1992 (Tashobya et
al. 2016; Awortiwi, 2010). Health sector decentralization was formally provided for under the 1995
national constitution and further operationalized in the Local Government Act of 1997 (Tashobya et al.
2016). Uganda’s district health system comprises of a district hospital and lower-level primary care health
facilities (Alonso-Garbayo et al. 2017). In 2014, management of the public sector payroll and salary
processing system was further decentralized to districts (Lwanga et al. 2018). District recruitment bodies
known as ‘district service commissions’ conduct interviews and selections of health workers. However,
devolved recruitment, in practice, is a shared responsibility between the districts (which declare vacancies
and make recruitment decisions) and relevant central government line ministries such as Finance and
Public Service which commit funds to the public sector wage bill. There exists a heavy dependence by
districts on central government grants for both capital development and basic operational funds (Alonso-
Garbayo et al. 2017).
Health worker shortages are pervasive at all levels of the health system in Uganda (Zakumumpa et al.
2017). In 2012, the Uganda government implemented an aggressive health workforce recruitment
program known as ‘the surge’ in which 7,112 health workers were recruited to plug severe sta ng gaps at
the primary care level (Jaskiewicz et al. 2016). Speci cally, health workers were recruited at the level of
Health Centre IVs (sub-district) and Health Centre IIIs (sub-county). However, severe sta ng gaps
remained at the level of district hospitals which have relatively high HIV client loads (Zakumumpa et al.
2016). In response to these sta ng gaps, and in order to accelerate progress towards HIV epidemic
control in Uganda, PEPFAR developed a 3-year ‘Human Resources for Health Support Program’ in 2013
that was implemented in 87 focus-districts (USAID,2019). According to the implementation plan, the
health workers would be initially recruited on contract by PEPFAR for a period of two years but would
subsequently be absorbed into the mainstream public service as soon as  scal space allowed. A total of
3,154 health workers were recruited by PEPFAR in Uganda between 2012 and 2015. Of these, 694 were
enrolled onto the Government of Uganda (GoU) payroll between 2013 and 2017 (USAID,2019). An
additional 1,965 health workers were expected to be transitioned to GoU in a phased manner between
2017 and 2020.
There has been increasing international assistance in addressing the human resources for health crisis in
SSA in the quest to sustain public health gains registered during periods of donor support and to ensure
the long-term sustainability of these outcomes during situations of declining donor aid (Micah et al.
2018). This has motivated  scal space analyses by external donors and recipient governments with a
view to increase reliance on domestic  nancing (Bennet et al. 2015; Resch and Hecht 2018; Burrows et al.
2016; Amaya et al. 2014; Vorgus et al. 2014, Gotsadze et al. 2019). Fiscal space has been de ned as ‘the
capacity of government to provide additional budgetary resources for a desired purpose without any
prejudice to the sustainability of its  nancial position’ (Heller, 2006). As donors like PEPFAR reduce their
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 nancial support to workforce costs, little is known about which factors hinder or facilitate the expansion
of  scal space for health worker recruitments within the Government. These data are critical to
understanding the dynamics involved, and strategies needed for increasing domestic  nancial
responsibility and local ownership by recipient countries (Bennet et al. 2015; Resch and Hecht 2018;
Burrows et al. 2016; Amaya et al. 2014; Vorgus et al. 2014; Vermund et al. 2012; Palen et al. 2012).
Although there is an accumulating evidence base on the notion of decision space in district health
systems, in general (Bossert and Mitchell 2011; Henrikson et al. 2016; Liwanag et al. 2018; Bulthuis et al.
2020), and around Human Resources for Health in particular (Alonso-Garbayo et al. 2017; Sumah and
Baetia 2019), there is little empirical attention to the prospect of creating  scal space for expanding the
health workforce in decentralized settings in low-income countries. We aimed to understand the process
of health worker transition from PEPFAR to Uganda Government payrolls and to explore the facilitators
and barriers encountered in increasing domestic  nancial responsibility for this transition.
Materials And Methods
Research Design
We utilized a qualitative case-study research design. Case-studies are recommended for an in-depth
understanding of complex phenomena within organizations (Gilson 2012; Yin, 1993). We conducted a
multiple case-study of 10 districts in Uganda categorized into two a) Eight districts with the highest rates
of absorption of health workers recruited with PEPFAR support dubbed ‘high absorbers’ cases b) Two
districts with the lowest absorption rates or the ‘low absorbers’ cases. We then conducted a comparative
analysis across the two categories of cases with regard to facilitators and barriers to health worker
transition.
Case-studies selection
The ten case-study districts were purposively selected from 87 districts in Uganda which received PEPFAR
support in recruiting health workers between 2013 to 2017.
Study districts were purposively selected based on secondary analyses of databases in the Human
Resources Information System (HRIS) and a locally-based international PEPFAR implementing
organization’s databases of health workers recruited between 2015 and 2017.
From these databases, we selected districts with the highest number of health workers transitioned from
PEPFAR to Government of Uganda payrolls. Table 1 shows we selected the districts with the highest
number of health workers transitioned from each of eight geographic sub-regions as de ned by the
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (Iganga, Sheema, Apac, Kasese, Napak, Nwoya, Tororo and Kampala) and
based on HIV burden (which was the key focus of PEPFAR support). We then selected two districts with
the lowest number of health workers absorbed onto their pay roll (Nakaseke and Bushenyi). Each of the
two districts had absorbed only one health worker since 2013 when PEPFAR’s health workforce transition
program commenced in Uganda.
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South Western Sheema 7.7 High number of transitioned HWs & high
HIV prevalence
East Central Iganga 4.4 High number of transitioned HWs, mixed
rural -urban
Mid- East Tororo 4.8 High number of transitioned HWs & cross
border dynamics, mainly urban
Mid -West Kasese 5.5 High number of transitioned HWs & cross
border dynamics, mainly urban





7.0 High number of transitioned HWs & high
HIV prevalence, largely rural
North East Napac 3.4 High number of transitioned HWs & hard to
reach, rural 
Kampala Kampala 6.6 Capital city& houses many agencies
involved in transition planning
 
Conceptual framework
We utilized an implementation research lens (Proctor et al. 2009) to better understand the process of
transitioning health workers from PEPFAR to Uganda Government payrolls and in order to explore the
facilitators and barriers involved in this process. More speci cally, we adopted the Consolidated
Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR) as the analytical framework underpinning this study
(Damschroder et al. 2009). The CFIR is a ‘meta-theoretical’ framework that was informed by earlier
implementation research frameworks and is derived from a robust systematic review of factors
in uencing effective or successful implementation of interventions (Means et al. 2020). The CFIR
framework provides a multi-level analysis lens that entails 39 constructs categorized under  ve ‘domains’
(Intervention characteristics, outer setting, inner setting, characteristics of individuals, and process of
implementation). The CFIR framework guided this study in three ways. It informed the diverse range of
study participants selected for this study especially those involved in the transition of the contract
workforce onto the public sector payroll. It helped in constructing our qualitative interview guides during
data collection and provided an overarching deductive thematic framework for our synthesis and
interpretation of study  ndings and in their presentation (Means et al. 2020).
Data collection
In keeping with the CFIR framework’s multi-level analysis lens, we selected study participants involved in
the transition process at the policy & planning, programmatic and implementation levels; a) national-level
policy & planning actors e.g. sector ministry o cials ( Ministry of Health, Finance and Public Service) and
PEPFAR as well as its ‘implementing partner (IP)’ playing the overall national coordination function of
overseeing the transition process b) Sub-national operational-level actors (e.g. District Health O cers,
District personnel o cers and PEPFAR implementing organizations at the sub-national operational level)
Page 6/23
c) Facility-level actors (Hospital administrators and the Principal Nursing O cers (Head Nurse) and
transitioned health workers across diverse cadres. The category of participants is shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Category of participants




South Western Sheema 7.7 High number of transitioned HWs
& high HIV prevalence
East Central Iganga 4.4 High number of transitioned HWs,
mixed rural -urban
Mid- East Tororo 4.8 High number of transitioned HWs
& cross border dynamics, mainly
urban
Mid -West Kasese 5.5 High number of transitioned HWs
& cross border dynamics, mainly
urban
Central 2 Mubende 7.4 High number of transitioned HWs




7.0 High number of transitioned HWs
& high HIV prevalence, largely
rural
North East Napac 3.4 High number of transitioned HWs
& hard to reach, rural
Kampala Kampala 6.6 Capital city& houses many
agencies involved in transition
planning




District Health Team leaders 12 3 15
Facility in-charges/ managers 18 4 22
Representatives of regional-based
PEPFAR Implementing Partners (IPs)
11 2 13
U.S. embassy program o cers
(USAID and CDC)
3 0 3
Focus Group Discussions 6 2 15
Transitioned health workers 75 12 87
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We conducted 15 face-to-face Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with national-level actors who had ‘insider’
insights into the health worker transition process right from inception (e.g. during signing of MoUs) such
as the overall coordinating PEPFAR implementing organization, program o cers in the United States
embassy in Uganda and high-level technocrats in the line Ministries of Health, Finance and Public Service
who were directly involved in the inception meetings and in the consensus building between PEPFAR and
the Uganda Government around absorption of health workers after their two-year contract period.
We then conducted 24 in-depth interviews (IDIs) with district-level actors in 10 case-study districts who
were directly involved in the implementation of health workforce transition at the sub-national level or
with in their decentralized settings. These included the District Health O cers and District Human
Resources O cers. The interview guide used in our interviews was constructed around the  ve major
CFIR-derived domains (Process of implementation, Intervention characteristics, outer setting, inner setting,
Characteristics of Individuals). This overarching framework helped in eliciting the facilitators and barriers
to health worker transition. Data were collected over two rounds. For the ‘high absorber’ cases, data were
collected between June and September 2018 (round 1) and January to March 2020 (round 2) among the
‘low absorber’ case districts.
Twelve focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with 87 health workers who were transitioned
onto the public pay roll in the case-study districts to better understand transition enablers and barriers
from their perspective. The FGDs were conducted on-site at 10 district hospitals. The interviews were
conducted in English by HZ and JR with the assistance of four research assistants who operated the
recorder and took notes.
To augment respondent data, we conducted a desk review of relevant documents such as ‘PEPFAR’s
Human Resources for Health(HRH) Support for Recruitment - Implementation plan of April 2013’. We
reviewed written memos from two central government line Ministries of Public Service and Health
addressed to district local government leaders urging them to absorb the health workforce recruited with
PEPFAR support.
Data analysis
Qualitative data were analyzed in line with the procedures recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994).
Interviews were recorded in English, transcribed verbatim into text transcripts by four research assistants.
Data were analyzed, in an iterative process, involving four major steps; a) Data familiarization: HZ, JR
read the interview transcripts multiple times) b) Developing a coding framework: We adopted the  ve
CFIR-derived domains (Intervention characteristics, outer setting, inner setting, characteristics of
individuals, and process of implementation) as an overarching deductive thematic framework as well as
inductively, from the data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) c) Data abstraction of the coded data into
thematic categories while engaging in a constant comparative analysis across the two categories of
cases of ‘High absorber’ and ‘lower absorber’ districts (Glaser and Straus, 1999) d) Overall interpretation
and synthesis: The  nal analyses were reached by consensus in a process involving at least four of the
authors.
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In addition, as shown in Table 3, we adopted the recommended procedures for ensuring rigour in case-
study analysis (Gilson et al., 2011).






We spent at least two weeks in each of the 10 case-study districts. Multiple
on-site visits were made to facilities hosting transitioned health workers and
spent engaging in informal discussions with facility in-charges, conducting
formal, face-to-face interviews with multiple informants, reviewing
documents and formal reports relating to the PEPFAR transition process.  .
Use of theory
 
We adopted the meta-theoretical  Consolidated Framework for




We selected 10 (out of 87) districts in Uganda that received PEPFAR Human
Resources for Health support. We selected  eight  districts with the highest
absorption rates of PEPFAR health workforce and two with the lowest
absorption rates.
Sampling In line with the multi-level analysis lens of the CFIR framework, we selected
participants from national-level actors (e.g. high-level central government
ministry actors) sub-national actors (e.g. District Health Teams and Regional-
based PEPFAR agencies) and facility-level participants (Hospital
Administrators, Head Nurses). Selected participants span across the policy &
planning, programmatic and implementation spectrums.
Multiple
methods
Multiple methods were used including face-to-face interviews, focus group
discussions with transitioned health workers, secondary analyses of (HRiS)
human resources information system data bases, document review and
informal engagements with District Health Teams.
Triangulation Case studies were constructed based on multiple data sources (e.g.
interviewee data , document review and respondent in-put such as with
transitioned health workers themselves).
Negative
case analysis
Emergent themes that contradicted initial assumptions and the theory





Data analysis at each of the four stages involved a team-based process
involving at least three authors. Across-case analyses were agreed upon by
consensus involving all authors.
Respondent
validation
The initial synthesis report by the investigators was presented before the
broad-based Human Resources for Health Technical Working Group (TWG) of
Uganda’s Ministry of Health for their in-put based on their combined
experience in the focus area.
Results
The identi ed facilitators and barriers to health worker transition emerging from this study are presented
based on the  ve CFIR-derived domains; a) Process of Implementation b) Characteristics of the
intervention b) Inner setting c) Outer setting and d) Characteristics of Individuals.
Page 9/23
Process of Implementation
Table 5 shows the milestones in the process of implementation of the health worker transition process.
Implementation happened at three major levels; a) national-level policy planning and coordination b) Sub-
national level programmatic supervision c) Facility-level implementation.






        MoU between PEPFAR and GoU       
       Harmonization of salaries        
       Inter-sector transition meetings around a road map 
       Developing a  transition road map
District         Joint Planning by regionally-based IPs & District actors.              
   
        Determining district HRH needs        
        Wage bill analysis       
        Health worker recruitment and deployment
Health facility level         Health worker orientation        
        HW performance management during the contract phase
 
National-level stakeholder engagement and transition
planning
At the national-level the process involved consensus building meetings between PEPFAR and Government
of Uganda (GoU) high-level actors around absorption of the recruited workforce after phasing out of
support. This culminated in a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two parties. The
MoU stipulated that PEPFAR would provide funds for the recruitment process and salary support for the
initial 2 years and GoU would subsequently enroll the recruited health workers on the public sector payroll
as soon as  scal space allowed. Inter-sector meetings were convened incorporating the relevant line
Ministries of Health, Finance and Public Service. PEPFAR was represented by its overall national
coordinating agency-an international NGO, which consulted with relevant program o cers at the United
States embassy in Uganda. In 2013, a health worker transition implementation plan and road map was
jointly agreed through a consultative process involving the two parties. Salary harmonization was key
point whereby PEPFAR would pay the recruited workforce (during their two-year contract phase) salaries
that were equivalent to public sector salary scales. With the exception of payment of a housing
(accommodation) allowance to the contract workforce, PEPFAR’s pay structure was well aligned with that
of the Uganda Government.
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The PEPFAR national coordinating agency continually monitored the transition process and regularly
shared insights and progress reports with Ministry of Health’s Human Resources for Health Technical
Working Group (TWG).
At the district-level, regionally-based PEPFAR implementing partner (IPs) organizations in the 87 focus-
districts in Uganda held transition planning meetings that engaged district-level actors such as District
Health Teams, Chief Administrative O cers (CAOs) and District Human Resource O cers as well as
District Service Commissions (DSCs) which make personnel selection decisions. During such meetings, a
transition road map at the district-level and the roles of the varied stakeholders were agreed upon. District
health teams in conjunction with District Human Resources O ces determined the health worker cadres
to be recruited based on the needs of individual districts. Table 4 shows that the bulk of health workers
recruited across case-study districts were midwives, nurses and clinical o cers. These vacancies were
advertised in national newspapers and through district and health facility notice boards. The processes
of initial formal recruitment were led by the districts with the  nancial support of PEPFAR provided
through its regionally-based IPs. Across all districts, contract staff were vetted by the District Service
Commissions to ensure that they met the Uganda public service standards for recruitment. The IPs
managed contracts and payrolls during the two-year contract phase for the transition workforce. In most
of the 87 focus-districts an independent PEPFAR contractor was mentioned as the personnel contracts
and payroll management agency. The District Health Teams together with IPs monitored performance of
contract health workers through instruments such as time sheets which were a basis for approving
salaries and later on absorption.
Table 4:  Cadres of health workers transitioned from PEPFAR to Government of Uganda 
 
HEALTH WORKER  CADRE No. of transitioned HWs % by HW cadre N=694
Enrolled Nurse 275 39.6
Enrolled Midwife 204 29.4
Medical Laboratory Technician 54 7.8
Medical Clinical Officer 50 7.2
Biostatistician 35 5.0
Medical Officer 30 4.3
Nursing Officer Nurse 14 2.0
Medical Laboratory Technologist 13 1.9
Enrolled comprehensive Nurse 8 1.2
Nursing Officer Midwife 6 0.9
Dispenser 3 0.4
Pharmacist 1 0.1
Medical Records Assistant 1 0.1
Laboratory Assistant  0 0.0
Anesthetic Officer 0 0.0
Total 694 99.9
Page 11/23
At the facility-level, contract staff were oriented in public service structures and processes by their
immediate supervisors. The district health teams and facility service managers were instrumental in
providing supervision and appraisal of contract staff. This formed the basis of selection of health
workers on contract who were to be absorbed onto the public pay roll.
Characteristics of the intervention
District wage bill budget analysis support
Technical support for district wage bill analyses was extended by the coordinating PEPFAR implementing
organization to districts. This was reported as a facilitator for HW transition in ‘high absorber’ districts.
Although there was a widely held perception, among actors within the district administrations that their
budgets could not accommodate any new personnel recruitments, technical support in scrutinizing
district wage bills revealed unutilized funds in the wage bill that were subsequently deployed to absorbing
the contract workforce in the transition MOU with PEPFAR.
‘PEPFAR helped us analyze the wage bill budget. There was some confusion with the Ministry of Public
service and Ministry of Health and here at the district. We were in the dark. So, PEPFAR came and
analyzed and found that we had a balance (funds for salaries) which we were not using. At least we
would  nd there was something ( scal space) for recruitments’ [KII, District O cial Iganga].
Conversely, in ‘low absorber’ districts participants reported that they did not receive technical support in
wage bill analyses. Hence, donor support in wage bill analyses emerged as a distinguishing feature
between the two categories of ‘high absorber’ and ‘low absorber’ districts.
However, Fig. 1 shows that even across the ‘high absorber’ districts there were still a signi cant number of
contract staff who were not enrolled onto the public sector payroll. Wage bill ceilings limited the ability of
districts to absorb a higher number of contract staff.
We observed that ‘low absorber’ districts had a higher number of their contract staff seconded to PNFPs
(Private Not-For-Pro ts) such as mission hospitals which had an even weaker absorption capacity (at
30%) compared to district local governments (at 55%).
‘The absorption has been very slow in PNFPs because these did not have money to absorb them. Most
PNFPs were comfortable offering services with low cadre staff and do not have a budget to hire high
cadre staff. But PEPEFAR hired these staff for the HIV response but health facilities do not have income
to maintain them. So transition in PNFP is very challenging’ (KII, National-Level o cial)
Figure 2 shows the number of health workers absorbed between 2012 and 2017. Secondary analyses of
HRIS and PEPFAR data bases revealed that over 500 of the recruited workforce were not absorbed in GoU
service after transition. Across case-study districts, a number of health workers left government service
before they were formally absorbed. In the focus group discussions, health workers indicated that
variable delays in accessing the public payroll after their 2-year PEPFAR contracts had run out, a lack of
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private accommodation (especially in rural Northern Uganda) and challenging work environments such
as chronic stock-outs of supplies contributed to the reduction of the pool of workforce available for
absorption. Many opted for alternative employment - mostly private sector providers.
Support in convening district personnel recruitment committees
PEPFAR support helped in unlocking the inherent and long-standing organizational barriers to expansion
of the existing district health workforce in ‘high absorber’ cases. A lack of basic operational funds for
supporting the lengthy procedures required for hiring new staff was a constraint raised across all case-
study districts. District Service commission (DSCs) are standing committees that make personnel
selection decisions and are meant to sit every three months. However, the DSCs were widely reported to
be dysfunctional owing to a chronic inability to raise monetary allowances for paying the non-full time
DSCs which are comprised of retired senior public servants. Running district job adverts in national
newspapers was said to be prohibitively expensive which further impeded personnel recruitments.
PEPFAR provided the necessary funding to kick-start recruitment processes in form of paying for
newspaper job adverts, providing monetary allowances to DSCs and sent observers to meetings where
job interviews were conducted which enhanced transparency and objectivity in the selection processes.
United States embassy program o cers in Uganda reported that PEPFAR had committed $ 9,333,891 for
the health worker transition programme in 2012 alone and an additional $ 4,494,149 in 2015. District-
level informants described the nature of PEPFAR support they received:
‘PEPFAR helped with providing the recruitment funds. It provided sitting allowances to enable District
Service Commissions to convene as well as providing allowances to committee members during the
interview of candidates. They facilitated most of the activities utilizing our own technical staff’ (KII,
District O cial, Sheema District).
Transparency in recruitment of the transitioned health
workforce
A number of health workers reported that before the PEPFAR intervention, DSCs had a reputation of
questionable objectivity in the selection of personnel due to a widely-held perception that nepotism and
bribery were common in district personnel recruitment decisions. Given this context, the selection of
PEPFAR-supported health workers through transparent and merit-based processes lent special legitimacy
to transition workforce which enhanced their absorption prospects into public service. District and facility-
level managers perceived PEPFAR-supported personnel as having been recruited through rigorous and
objective procedures.
‘I look at it as a good strategy for recruiting staff. This issue of our local politics of you are going to
recruit this one’s daughter (nepotism), you are going to solicit bribes… those ones didn’t surface anywhere.
It was a puri ed process that government didn’t have any reason whatsoever to object to their absorption.
Someone recruited by an NGO interested in health you can’t doubt their quali cations, you can’t doubt
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their capabilities and then I think it also eliminated this issue of tribalism (ethnic biases) in recruitments
[KII, District O cial, Tororo].
The transitioned workforce was perceived as competent and suitable for absorption into government
service. The two-year contract phase funded by PEPFAR allowed facility-level managers to identify
resilient and dependable HWs for absorption. In addition, this phase also provided HWs with an
opportunity to be inducted and initiated into government systems and work environments.
‘When they came the health workers on contract exhibited professionalism in their work. They were good
people and immediately, they started working. The quality of service, was realized by the community. I
think there is a visible change in the hospital since they came in [KII, District O cial, Apac].
Outer setting
Multi-sectoral engagements in transition process
At an institutional level, multi-stakeholder engagements involving actors at the national, sub-national and
facility-levels were identi ed as a major transition facilitator by participants in ‘high absorber’ districts.
At national-level, PEPFAR was involved in multi-sectoral engagements of high-level actors with authority
for approving health worker recruitments in relevant central government sector ministries such as
Finance, Public Service and Health.
A transition road map and memorandum of understanding (MoU) was agreed between PEPFAR and
sector ministries in which PEPFAR undertook to provide salary support of the new workforce recruits for
two years while Uganda Government would enroll these health workers onto the public sector payroll as
soon as  scal space permitted. This facilitated buy-in from in uential actors in sector ministries. At the
sub-national level, PEPFAR implementing organizations in varied geographic sub-regions spearheaded
engagement with sub-national actors such as District Health O cers and Chief Administrative O cers
(CAOs). MoUs was signed between regionally-based PEPFAR implementing organizations and the
districts under their purview.
‘We had several interactions. Ministry of Health invited us. As a district, we are supposed to implement
Ministry of Health policies. The policy was such that PEPFAR would recruit those health workers on
contract and with time, the districts, with help of Ministry of Health and Finance would avail a wage bill to
absorb them. So that was the understanding. First between Ministry of Health and PEPFAR, then we as
implementing partners as districts and local government. That’s how we came on board’ (KII District
O cial Sheema).
Crucially, PEPFAR worked within established Uganda Government recruitment process and structures.
Districts determined the cadres that would be hired based on their needs. District Service Commissions
(DSCs) made the ultimate hiring decisions. This lent legitimacy to the cohort of health workers recruited
with PEPFAR support.
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‘All recruitment of contract staff was done by district service commissions (DSCs). So when it comes to
absorption, such health workers are regularized because they were already recognized as legitimate staff
hired through competent structures’ [KII, National- Level o cial].
Inner setting
Prioritization of health workers in district personnel recruitments
The prioritization of health workers in district personnel recruitments was a key distinguishing feature
between ‘high absorbers’ and ‘low absorbers’ cases. In ‘high absorber’ districts such as Kasese and
Sheema, participants were unequivocal in relaying the notion that their district administrations
deliberately prioritized the health workforce in recruitments. In the ‘high absorber’ cases, whenever some
 scal space in the district wage bill emerged, slots for health workers were ‘ring- fenced’ as the overall
priority- taking the shape of an informal recruitment policy.
‘In fact we had to trade off some cadres, those ones who were not extremely needed or useful we had to
keep them off in order to bring in the more useful staff like the midwives and clinical o cers’ (KII, District
O cial, Apac)
‘You may have the wage bill but how are you going to prioritize the cadres of peoples you are going to
recruit? You may say my entire Health Centre IIs need a security guard. You may recruit like 20 porters. I
know they are needed there but is it a priority? (KII, District O cial, Sheema).
Although we found that ‘high absorber’ districts prioritized health workers in their wage bill, national-level
informants reported that this was further reinforced by formal written memos from central government
Ministries of Public Service and Health to the district political and technical leadership asking that they
prioritize the absorption of PEPFAR-supported workforce in the available wage bills .These memos were
written in March 2013 as a result of the protracted engagements by PEPFAR and high-level actors in
sector ministries which were in line with the jointly developed health worker transition road map.
Characteristics of Individuals
Presence of transition ‘Champions’
The presence or absence of transition ‘champions’ differentiated between ‘high absorber’ and ‘low
absorber’ districts.
Whereas ‘high absorber’ districts reported the presence of internal transition ‘champions’, their absence in
participant discourses in ‘low absorber’ districts was unmistakable.
Transition ‘champions’ were individuals who went above and beyond the call of duty of their positions to
promote the absorption of health workers onto the public pay roll. These champions were reported at
both the district and facility-levels. The presence of champions at multiple levels created synergies in
promoting health worker absorption in ‘high absorber’ districts. The frequently cited champions include
in uential actors such as Chief Administrative O cers (CAOs) of host districts, District Health O cers
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(DHOs) and Hospital administrators who actively pushed for the recruitment and absorption of health
workers and enrollment on the government payroll.
‘We had a smooth transition because the team in XXX (District) is very proactive. They don’t operate like
they are in government. The CAO (Chief Administrative O cer) was an experienced man so he was quick
to come in and push the recruitment process along. Much more than it normally is. The District Human
Resource O cer was very active. They did their work in a timely way and actively pushed to have the
HWs absorbed. Issues of health workers were prioritized. Actually, the  rst batch of health workers we
even gave them appointment letters before their contracts were over’ [KII, District O cial, Iganga].
Champions tirelessly worked to expedite processes in the context of the typically lengthy administrative
procedures in the Ugandan public sector. They acted as ‘persistence enhancers’ for health workers and
even appropriated district  nances to create ‘stop-gap’ monetary allowances for health workers before
they were able to access the public payroll.
Actors at the facility-level were frequently cited as transition champions. Facility in-charges were
motivated by a need to avoid losing skilled health workers who had been posted at their health facilities
as contract staff. As such, they were instrumental in ensuring timely appraisal of contract health workers
but also engaged in active follow-up with the District Service Commissions at the district administration
headquarters for absorption of health workers to avoid losing their contract staff. Facility in-charges in
‘high absorber’ districts actively engaged their transition workforce in activities such as surgical camps
and community outreaches to enable them secure some  eld monetary allowances to sustain them as
they awaited enrolment on the payroll which was characterized by prolonged delays in several of the
case-study districts.
‘The salaries could delay for two to three months.
We have PHC (primary health care) funds earmarked to this facility.
We used some of this to buy them basics such as soap and sugar that could also help them to persist
and endure’ [KII, Facility in-charge, Nwoya District].
Discussion
We conducted a multiple case-study of 10 districts in Uganda to better understand why they had
variations in absorption rates of the health workforce transitioned from PEPFAR payroll support. We
found distinguishing features between the two ‘low absorber’ districts and the eight ‘high absorber’
districts. We found that in the latter cases, conducting a wage bill analysis of district budgets to discover
unutilized funds, the presence of transition ‘champions’ and prioritizing health workers in the available
district wage bill differentiated them from the ‘low absorber’ districts where these attributes were absent.
At an institutional level, multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral engagements, agreeing on a joint transition
road map and PEPFAR’s alignment with Uganda government pay scales and recruitment processes
enabled over 694 health workers to be added to the public sector payroll. However, limitations in district
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wage bills, prolonged delays in enrollment onto the public sector payrolls and a lack of accommodation
for transition health workers were common across all districts.
Implementation research and strategies for effective donor
transitions
The PEPFAR health worker transition case-studies documented here offer implementation research
lessons on effective donor transition for global health initiatives and bilateral development partners. We
observe that, in this particular study, PEPFAR’s transition model conforms with three (of the six) donor
transition ‘good practices’ which were earlier proposed (Vorgus & Graff, 2014). More speci cally, we
found that agreeing on a joint transition road map, communicating early about the transition intentions
and aligning with Uganda government salary scales and recruitment procedures enhanced health
workforce absorption. In our analysis of participant discourses, we noted some but limited monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms in the health worker transition road map and implementation plan which is
recommended in the literature. There is a sparse but emerging evidence base on recommended donor
transition planning and management in the health sector (Bennett et al., 2015; Burrows et al., 2016;
Amaya et al. 2014; Vorgus & Graff, 2014; Palen et al. 2012).
Although previous studies have noted PEPFAR’s strong vertical-orientation in its support for national HIV
responses, often provided within parallel structures to those of donor-recipient governments (Windisch et
al.
2011; Luboga et al., 2016; Ssengooba et al. 2017), we document a unique case-study of a less vertical
PEPFAR aid approach which resulted in increased Uganda Government budgetary allocation for
expanding the health workforce in districts without which support, the absorption of 694 health workers
might not have been triggered. A notable  nding of this study was that PEPFAR’s multi-sectoral
engagement of high-level actors in Uganda generated buy-in from the in uential Ministry of Finance
which technically commits votes in the national budget. Although there are mounting calls for
engagement of Ministries of Finance in expanding  scal space for health (Whyle and Olivier, 2016), there
is little research documenting ‘catalyst’ engagements that result in tangible outcomes especially with
regard to addressing the human resources for health crisis. Our study suggests that sustained
engagements with the Ministry of Finance and other line ministries helped 694 health workers transition
to public sector payrolls. However, Bennett et al. 2018 highlight the in uence of external development
partners in providing the  nancial impetus for initiating multi-sectoral collaborations, and note that local
actors may not have this leverage or obtaining organizational cultures may not be supportive “In LMIC, a
related factor concerns the role of external development partners. Multi-sectoral action that has strong
external support likely has better access to  nancial resources, but may suffer from limited local
ownership (and hence perhaps low motivation), and conceivably organizational blue prints that do not
align with ways of doing business in country.”
A review article assessing health-system strengthening (HSS) interventions by Adam et al., 2009,
recommends the application of a ‘systems thinking’ lens in designing HSS interventions that engage and
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cut across the six ‘building blocks’ or sub-components of a health-system.
In re ecting on participants’ discourses in this study, we observe that PEPFAR’s Human Resources for
Health support in Uganda and the subsequent donor transition effort engaged with at least four
intersecting health system ‘building blocks’ namely; health  nancing, health information systems,
leadership and governance and health workforce (Mounier-Jack et al.
2014; van Olmen et al. 2014; Zakumumpa et al. 2018; Mutale et al. 2014).
In this study we found that Private Not-for-Pro t (PNFP) facilities had lower absorption rates of the
workforce transitioned from PEPFAR support at (30% absorption) compared to district local governments
with a 55% absorption rate.
Our study adds to accumulating calls for government support to the private sector in bolstering human
resources for health including in payroll support (Zakumumpa et al. 2016) and the need for increased
engagement by donors and governments of the private sector in moves towards universal health
coverage (Ssenyonjo et al. 2019; Montagu et al. 2016; Wilhelm et al. 2020).
The adopted  ve domains of the CFIR framework were helpful in providing a broad deductive framework
for our overall synthesis and interpretation of study  ndings as well as in their presentation-we note that
although the framework categorizes into  ve domains, some of our  ndings appeared to cut across more
than one domain. For instance, we found that the prioritization of health workers in district wage bill
commitments derived from ‘inner setting’ priority-setting but was re-enforced by ‘outer setting’ factors
such as written memos from central government line ministries. In this sense, our study suggests some
dynamic interactions in facilitators of health worker transition in Uganda. The notion of dynamic
interactions in factors in uencing the implementation and sustainability of health program interventions
has been observed in previous studies (Stirman et al. 2012; Durlak & DuPre, 2008; Zakumumpa et al.,
2018)
The challenges of workforce recruitments in decentralized
settings
This study illuminates the dysfunction that underpins recruitment freezes in decentralized settings in
Uganda that ranges from insu cient basic operational funds for convening recruitment bodies, limited
expertize in wage bill analysis, district workforce budget caps and common perceptions of nepotism and
corruption in recruitment decisions. Previous studies have reported the constraints encountered in health
workforce recruitments in decentralized systems in Uganda, Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria (Ssengooba et
al. 2007 ; Sumah and Baatiema 2019; Munga et al. 2009; Mbemba et al. 2016; Sakyi et al. 2011;
Frumence et al. 2013).
Our study does however highlight the potential in uence of ‘change agents’ in driving health system
reform and in unlocking  scal space for health in a resource-constrained setting. At an institutional level,
we found that the presence of transition ‘champions’ at multiple levels including within district
governance systems but also at the facility-level was a key enabler of increasing budgetary allocations
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for expanding the health workforce in Uganda. We  nd that PEPFAR support had a ‘trigger effect’ that
synergized the role of internal ‘champions’ in promoting health system strengthening. In in uencing
health system strengthening in Uganda, PEPFAR can be said to have been acting as a catalyst. The role
of ‘external change agents’ is recognized in implementation research (Means et al. 2020). Our  ndings
add to the accumulating evidence base pointing to the in uence of leadership and governance on health-
systems development and outcomes in decentralized settings (Schneider et al.,2019; Mitchell & Bossert,
2010, Abimbola et al., 2019).
Conclusion
Overall, PEPFAR’s Human Resource for Health support acted as a catalyst for increasing GoU and facility-
level budget allocations towards expanding the health workforce in focus districts in Uganda. Our case-
studies offer implementation research lessons on effective donor transition and insights into pragmatic
strategies for expanding  scal space for health in a low-income setting.
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